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### THOUGHTS ON PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD.

Translated from the German of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER by CHARLES JOSÉFÉ.

[CHAPTER I. OF THE "PARERGA UND PARALIPOMENA."]

§ 1. The foundation on which rest all our cognitions and science, is the inexplicable. To this therefore every exposition recurs, by means of connecting links, many or few, as on the sea the sounding-lead finds the bottom sometimes at a greater, sometimes at a less depth, but must at last reach it everywhere. This inexplicable belongs to metaphysics.

§ 2. Most men think continually, that they are a certain man, this or that man (*τις ἀνδρωπος*), together with the corollaries that follow from this thought; but seldom do they think that they are man in general (*ὁ ἀνδρωπος*), though that is the main point. Those few, who indulge in the last idea more than in the first, are philosophers. The tendency of the others is to see in general in all things nothing but the single and individual, not the general. Only those spirits who are highly endowed, see in single things, according to their greatness of genius, more and more that which is common to, all. This important difference penetrates the whole cognitive faculty in such a manner as to extend to the contemplation of the most common things; these, therefore, present entirely different phases to the man of genius and the common man. This comprehension of the general in the individuals, which alone present themselves, is harmonious with that which I have called the pure, will-less subject of cognition and set up

as the subjective correlate of the Platonic idea; because the cognition can remain will-less only when it is directed to the general; the objects of will lie in individual things; therefore the cognition of animals is strictly confined to the individual, and their intellect in consequence remains exclusively in the service of their will. On the contrary, that direction of the mind to the general is the indispensable condition of genuine achievements in philosophy, poetry, arts, and sciences.

For the *intellect in the service of the will*—that is, in its practical use—there exist only individual things; for the intellect which devotes itself to arts and sciences—that is, which is active for itself—there are only generalities, whole kinds, species, orders, *ideas* of things, since even the plastic artist intends to represent in the individual only the idea—that is, the genus. This rests upon the fact, that the *will* immediately is only directed upon individual things: they are its proper objects; for only those have an empirical reality. Ideas, species, orders, on the contrary, can only very indirectly become its objects. Therefore the inexperienced man has no comprehension of general truths; but the genius overlooks and neglects the individual; the enforced occupation with single things as such, as it forms the subject-matter of practical life, is to him nothing but a burdensome sojourn.

§ 3. The two primary requisites to philosophy are these: firstly, that one have the courage to hold no question back from discussion; and secondly, that he bring clearly before consciousness everything that is *axiomatic*, in order to be able to conceive it as a problem. Lastly, it is necessary to true philosophizing that the mind be really unbiased; it must not pursue any aims, and therefore not be influenced by the will, but must devote itself wholly to the information which is given to it by the intuitive world and its own consciousness.—Professors of Philosophy, on the contrary, take into consideration their personal advantage and profit, and whatever leads to it; hence their earnestness. Therefore they do not perceive at all many obvious things; nay, they never come to a clear understanding even of the problems of philosophy.

§ 4. The poet brings to the imagination pictures of life,

human characters and situations, puts everything into motion, and leaves it to everybody to think about those pictures as far as his power of mind is enabled to grasp them. Therefore he can amuse men of the most different faculties, even fools and wise men at the same time. But the philosopher does not bring the life itself but the finished thoughts which he abstracted from it, and asks now that his reader think exactly so and just as far as he did himself. On this account his public is necessarily very small. The poet, therefore, may be compared to him who brings the flowers; the philosopher, to him who brings their quintessence.

Another great advantage which poetical labors possess over philosophical ones is this, that all the works of the poets exist side by side without interfering with each other,—even the most heterogeneous of them can be enjoyed and esteemed by the same mind; while each philosophical system, as soon as it has appeared, endeavors to ruin all its brethren, just as an Asiatic sultan does at his entrance into power. For, as there can be but one queen in the beehive, so there can be prevalent but one philosophy. The systems are as unsocial in their nature as spiders; each sits alone in its web, and watches how many flies may be caught in it, but approaches another spider only to fight with it. Therefore, while the works of the poets peacefully pasture side by side like lambs, those of the philosophers are born voracious beasts, and their longing to destroy is even like scorpions, spiders, and some insects, chiefly directed towards their own species. They come forth into the world like the harnessed men from the sowing of the dragon's teeth of Jason, and all of them have hitherto, like these, destroyed each other. This combat has endured already more than two thousand years; will there ever result from it a last victory and an eternal peace?

In consequence of this essentially polemical nature, of this *bellum omnium contra omnes* of the philosophical systems, it is infinitely more difficult to acquire any importance as a philosopher than as a poet. All that is demanded by the work of the poet of the reader, is to give himself up to the entertaining or inspiring writings, and to devote himself for a few hours. But the work of the philosopher, on the contrary, demands a change in his entire manner of thinking; it

demands of him that he declare as error everything that he has learned and believed in this province, that he regard his time and trouble as lost, and that he begin anew; at most, it leaves him a few rudiments of a preceding system from which to make his basis. Besides this, he finds an opponent *ex officio* in every teacher of a system already existing; nay, even the state sometimes takes some system chosen by it under its protection, and prevents by its powerful, material means, the rising of every other system. Consider further, that the number of the philosophical public is to that of the poetical as the number of people who want to be instructed is to those who want to be amused, and one will readily judge, *quibus auspiciis*, a philosopher makes his appearance. But, in return for this, it is the approbation of the thinkers, of the elect of long periods, of all countries, and of all nations, that recompenses the philosopher. The multitude gradually learns from authority to honor his name. In consequence of this, and because of the slow but deep influence of the course of philosophy upon all mankind, and since the history of philosophy for thousands of years marches beside the history of kings, and counts a hundred times less names than this, it is something great to secure for one's own name a fixed place in it.

§ 5. The philosophical writer is the guide and his reader the wanderer. In order to come together, they first of all must start together; that is, the author must take his reader from a point of view which they surely have in common; but this can be no other than that of the empirical consciousness common to all of us. Here he must firmly take him by the hand, and now try how far above the clouds he may reach with him by leading him step by step on the mountain-path. This is the procedure of Kant: he set out entirely from the common consciousness, as well of the thinking subject as of other things. How incorrect, on the contrary, would it be to proceed from a pretended intellectual intuition of hyper-physical relations, or from a reason that perceives the transcendent, or from an absolute self-thinking reason; for all this is not proceeding from immediate communicable perceptions, and therefore, even at the beginning, the reader never knows whether he follows his author, or whether he is far from him.

§ 6. The discourse with some one else about things is to our own earnest meditations and inward contemplation of them as a piece of machinery to a living organism. For only in the last is everything as cut from one piece, or as played in one key; therefore can it attain full clearness, distinctness, and true connexion, even unity; with the other, on the contrary, there will be put together heterogeneous pieces of very different origin, and a certain unity of motion be enforced, which often unexpectedly stops. For only one's self understands himself perfectly, others only half; for all one can get at is the community of the conceptions, but not the community which lies at the foundation of the intuitive comprehension of them. Deep philosophical thoughts will therefore perhaps never be brought to light, by way of community of thought, in the dialogue. However, this will be very advantageous as a previous exercise to start the problems, or to ventilate them, and afterwards for the examination, control and criticism of the solutions offered. In this sense, also, the dialogues of Plato are composed, in consequence of which there proceeded from his school the second and third academy with an increasing skeptical tendency. As a mode of communicating philosophical thought, the written dialogue will answer the purpose only where the object permits two or more quite different or even opposed views, the decision between which shall be either left to the reader, or which, taken together, shall serve as a supplement to each other for the complete and right understanding of the matter: to the first case also belongs the refutation of raised objections. The dialogistic form chosen in regard to this must then become truly dramatic for the reason that the difference of opinions is rendered prominent and worked out fundamentally: there must be really two who are speaking. Without this aim it is but an idle play, and this it is generally.

§ 7. Neither our knowledge nor our insight will ever be much increased by comparing and discussing that which is spoken by others; for that is only just as if one poured water from one vessel into another. Insight and knowledge can be really augmented only through one's own consideration of things themselves; for this alone is the ever-near and living spring. It therefore is very curious to see how those who

pretend to be philosophers are always occupied in the first way and seem not at all to know the other one; how they are always occupied by what this one has said, and what that one might have meant; so that they, as it were, always turn up old vessels anew to see whether there might not have remained in them a little drop, while the living spring flows neglected at their feet. There is nothing that betrays their incapacity more, or so plainly gives the lie to their assumed air of importance, thoughtfulness, and originality.

§ 8. Those who hope to become philosophers by studying the history of philosophy, may rather learn from it that philosophers, just as poets, are only born, and that more seldom.

§ 9. A curious and unworthy definition of philosophy, but which is given by Kant, is this, that it is a science of mere ideas, while the whole character of the ideas is nothing but what is put into them after it has been borrowed and begged of the intuitive perception, which is the real and inexhaustible spring of all cognition. A true philosophy, therefore, cannot be spun out from mere abstract ideas, but it must be founded on internal as well as external observation and experience. Neither will anything extraordinary ever be accomplished in philosophy by attempting the combination of ideas, as it has been carried out so very often by the sophists of our times, that is, by Fichte and Schelling, but most repugnantly by Hegel, besides also, in morals, by Schleiermacher. Philosophy as well as art and poetry must have its source in the intuitive apprehension of the world; moreover, it must not proceed in too cold blood, though the head has so much necessity for keeping cool; so that if at last the whole man, with heart and head, comes to action, he may be moved throughout. Philosophy is no algebraic example. Vauvenargue rather is right when he says, "Great thoughts come from the heart."

§ 10. Considered in general, the philosophy of all times may be conceived as a pendulum swinging to and fro between rationalism and illuminism; that is, between the use of the objective and that of the subjective sources of cognition. Rationalism, originally appointed to serve the will alone, and which therefore is directed outward, first appears as dogmatism, as which it is altogether objective. Then it

changes into skepticism, in consequence of which it becomes at last criticism, which undertakes to settle the dispute by taking into consideration the subject; that is, it becomes transcendental philosophy. By this I understand every philosophy which proceeds from the principle that its nearest and immediate objects are not things, but only the human consciousness of them, which therefore must never be left out of account. The French, not very appropriately, call this "*la méthode psychologique*" in opposition to "*la méthode logique*," whereby they understand that philosophy which naturally proceeds from any objects or objectively considered conceptions—that is, dogmatism. Arrived at this point, rationalism recognizes that its organon only conceives the phenomenon, but does not arrive at the last, intrinsic, and essential essence of things.

In all its phases, but nowhere more than just here, illuminism makes its appearance in opposition to it, and this essentially directed inward, has as its organon internal illumination, intellectual intuition, higher consciousness, immediately perceiving reason, consciousness of God, unification, etc., and it disregards rationalism as the "light of Nature." If, now, it assumes as its foundation a religion, it becomes mysticism. Its chief deficiency is that its cognitions are not communicable, partly because for the inner perception there is no criterion of the identity of the object of different subjects, partly because such a conception ought to be communicated by means of the language; but this, originated in behalf of the conception of the intellect which is directed outwardly by means of abstractions from it, is altogether unfit to express those fundamentally different internal conditions which are the matter of illuminism. This, therefore, had to form for itself a language of its own; but this again, on account of the first reason, was not possible. Now, as this cognition is not communicable, it also is indemonstrable; whereupon rationalism, at the hand of skepticism, enters again the field. Illuminism is already to be detected in some parts of Plato; but it more decidedly appears in the philosophy of the New-Platonists, of the gnostics, of Dionysius Areopagita, as well as of Scotus Erigena; again, with the Mohamedans, as the doctrine of *Sufi*; in India it prevails in the Vedanta and Mimansa; but most decidedly



belong to it Jacob Böhme and all the Christian mystics. It always appears when naturalism has run through a course without reaching its aim: so it appeared in Tauler and the author of the German theology, and others, towards the end of the scholastic philosophy, as its antithesis, as mysticism; and likewise in modern times, as opposed to the philosophy of Kant, in Jacobi and Schelling; also in the last period of Fichte.—However, philosophy should be communicable cognition, therefore it must be rationalism. Consequently, I have in mine, at the end, it is true, pointed out the domain of illuminism as something existing, but have been very cautious not to enter it even in the least; in return, I also did not attempt to give the final explanations of the existence of the world, but only went so far as it is possible to go, on the objective, rational mode. As to the illuminism, I left its space free, where it, in its own manner, may find the solution of all problems without the possibility of crossing my path, or the opportunity of ever disputing with me.

However, there may often enough lie a hidden illuminism at the foundation of rationalism, towards which then the philosopher looks as to a concealed compass, while he avowedly directs his way only by the stars—that is, the external and clearly presented objects—and ostensibly takes only these into account. This is admissible, because he does not undertake to communicate the uncommunicable cognition, but his communication remains plainly objective and rational. This may have been the case with Plato, Spinoza, Malebranche, and many others: it does not concern anybody; for these are the secrets of their hearts. But, on the contrary, the loud appeal to intellectual intuition, and the bold relation of its contents, together with the pretension of objective sufficiency of them, as with Fichte and Schelling, is insolent and rejectable.

Illuminism, however, in itself is a natural attempt to explore the truth, and so far it may be justified. For the intellect, which is directed outward as a mere organon for the aims of the will, and consequently only something secondary, is but a part of our whole essence: it belongs to the phenomenon, and its cognition corresponds only to this because it exists only in its behalf. What, therefore, can be more natural,

after it failed with the objective-conceiving intellect, but to bring into action our whole remaining nature, which is also but a thing in itself—that is, which belongs to the true essence of the world, and consequently must bear in itself in some way or other the solution of all problems, and to seek help by it;—as did the ancient Germans, who, after they had lost everything, at last staked their own persons. The only right and valid objective way to accomplish this, is to conceive the empirical fact of a will which makes itself known in our interior—nay, even forms the only essence of it—and to apply it to the explanation of the objective external cognition, as I consequently have done. But, for the reasons explained above, the mode of illuminism does not lead to the end.

§ 11. Mere craftiness enables one, perhaps, to be a skeptic, but not to be a philosopher. However, skepticism is to philosophy what the opposition is in parliament, and is just as salutary, even necessary. Everywhere it depends upon the fact that philosophy can present no evidence such as mathematics possesses, and man is equally devoid of the instinct of animals which insures success from the start. Therefore, against every system skepticism can lay itself in the scale; but its weight at last will become so insignificant against the other that it will do it no more harm than does the fact that the arithmetical quadrature of the circle is but approximative, invalidate its usefulness. That which one knows is of double importance, if at the same time one confesses himself not to know what he does not know. By this means the former is secured against the suspicion to which it is exposed, if one pretends to know what he does not know, as, for instance, did the partisans of Schelling.

§ 12. Certain propositions which one accepts as true without examination, and of which he is so firmly convinced, that, even if he desired, he could not examine them earnestly, because he cannot at all doubt them, are called judgments of reason. This firm credit they obtained because they were incessantly dictated, and by that means instilled into him when he commenced to talk and to think; for which reason his habit of thinking them is just as old as the habit of thinking in general. Whence it comes that he is no longer able

to separate the two; they have grown into his brain. What is said here is so true, that it would be on the one hand superfluous and on the other hazardous to cite any examples.

§ 13. No opinion of the world, if derived from an objective, intuitive apprehension of things, and if consequentially carried through, can be entirely erroneous; but it is, when the worst comes to the worst, only defective: so, for instance, is perfect materialism, absolute idealism, and others. They are all true, but they are all at the same time true; consequently, their truth is only a relative one. Every such apprehension, viz., is only true from a particular standpoint, just as a picture represents a landscape from one point of view only. But if one rises above the standpoint of such a system, then he will perceive the relativity of its truth, i. e. its one-sidedness. Only the highest standpoint, overlooking everything, can give absolute truth. In consequence of this, it is true, for instance, if I regard myself as a mere transient product of nature, which, having originated in time, is destined to total destruction — as in the case of Koheleth; but at the same time it is true that everything which has ever been and ever will be is I, and there is nothing besides me. It is just as true, if I, after the manner of Anakreon, place the highest happiness in the enjoyment of the present; but at the same time it is true, if I conceive the wholesomeness of suffering, and the nugatoriness, yea, the perniciousness of all enjoyment, and conceive death as the aim of my existence.

The reason of all this is, that every view which can be logically carried out is nothing but an apprehension of nature transferred into ideas, and which on this account is a fixed, intuitive, and objective one; but nature—that is, the intuitive—never lies, nor contradicts itself, because its essence excludes anything of that kind. Wherever, therefore, there exists a contradiction or a lie, there are thoughts that have not originated from objective apprehension; as, for instance, in optimism. But an objective apprehension can, on the contrary, be incomplete and one-sided: then it deserves a supplement, not a refutation.

§ 14. Men are never tired of reproaching metaphysics with its little progress, in the face of the great strides of physical science. Even Voltaire exclaims: “*O métaphysique! nous*

*sommes aussi avancés que du temps des premiers Druides."*

But what other science besides this has always had a continual restraint, at all times an antagonist *ex officio*, an appointed fiscal accuser, a king's champion in full armor, who encountered the defenceless and unarmed? Never will it be able to show its real powers, to take its gigantic steps, so long as one demands of it under threats its subordination to the dogmas which are calculated for the very small capacity of the great multitude. First they bind our arms, and then they mock us, so that we cannot accomplish anything. The religions have taken possession of the metaphysical talent of men, partly by laming it through a premature inculcation of its dogmas, partly by forbidding and prohibiting all free and unprejudiced expressions in such a way that to man, free inquiry into the most important and most interesting matters about his existence is partly forbidden, partly directly or indirectly is hindered, partly is subjectively made impossible to him by that lameness, and in such a manner that the most sublime of his talents is bound in fetters.

§ 15. To make ourselves tolerant towards views opposed to ours, and patient in contradiction, nothing perhaps is more efficacious than the recollection of how often we ourselves, on the very same subject, have successfully cherished quite contrary opinions, and have changed these again and again even in a very short time; how we have rejected, and accepted again, sometimes the one opinion, sometimes the opposite, as the subject presented itself now in this, then in another light. Likewise to produce any effect in our contradiction of the opinion of others, nothing is more efficacious than the phrase: "the same I formerly used to believe, too; but," etc.

§ 16. An erroneous doctrine, whether it proceed from an erroneous view or from a bad intention, is always destined only for a special occasion,—truth alone, for all time,—though it may be mistaken or stifled for awhile. Yet as soon as there comes a little light from within, or a little air from without, somebody will appear to proclaim or to defend it. Because it did not proceed from the design of any party, every eminent genius will be its advocate. For it resembles the magnet, which always and everywhere points towards an absolute fixed point of the world; the erroneous doctrine, on

the contrary, resembles a statue which points with its hand towards another statue, separated from which it has lost all signification.

§ 17. What is most opposed to the discovery of truth is not the false appearance proceeding from things and leading to error; nor immediately weakness of mind; but it is the preconceived opinion, the prejudice, which as a spurious *a priori* opposes itself to the truth, and resembles a contrary wind which drives back the ship from the direction in which alone the land is situated, in such a manner that rudder and sails are vainly active.

§ 18. The verse of Goethe in Faust,

“What thou hast inherited from thy fathers,  
Acquire it to possess it,”

I comment upon as follows: To find, what thinkers have found already, by our own means, independent of them and before knowing of their discovery, is of great importance and advantage. For what one thinks himself he will understand more profoundly than what he has learned, and, if afterwards he finds it with those leaders, he will obtain unexpectedly a strong and truth-testifying confirmation by other acknowledged authority, whereby he then will gain confidence and constancy to defend it against every contradiction. But, on the contrary, if one has found it first in books and afterwards also got at the same result by his own meditation, then he never certainly knows whether he thought and judged this himself, or merely repeated and experienced what he had found in books. But this makes a great difference in regard to the certainty of the matter. For in the last case, it may be, that he has followed the errors of his predecessors; just as water easily takes the course marked out for it. If two count, each one for himself, and get the same result, then this will be a sure one, but not if the counting of the one has been only reviewed by the other.

§ 19. It is a consequence of the constitution of our intellect which is derived from the will, that we cannot forbear to comprehend the world either as end and aim, or as means. The first only would denote that its existence is justified through its being, consequently is by all means to be preferred to its non-existence. But the perception that it is only a field of

battle for suffering and dying beings, does not permit this opinion. However, the infinitude of time already past, by virtue of which every attainable aim could have been reached long since, does not permit us to conceive it as means. From this it follows that every application to the totality of things, or the world, of the supposition natural to our intellect, is a transcendental one; that is, such a one as perhaps is permitted in the world but not *of* the world: which is to be explained from the fact that it originated from the nature of our intellect, which, as I have shown, originated in the service of an individual will — that is, for the attainment of its objects — and therefore is calculated exclusively for aims and means, consequently does not understand nor conceive anything else.

§ 20. If one looks about him, where is presented to us the immeasurability and the innumerableness of beings, his insignificance is made apparent, and man as a mere individual seems to vanish. Overpowered by this preponderance of bulk and number, one imagines that the philosophy which is directed to the without — that is, objective philosophy — can only be on the right track: the most ancient Greek philosophers do not even think of doubting this. But if, on the contrary, one looks within, then he finds, first of all, that every individual sympathizes directly with himself, even takes more interest in himself than in all the rest taken together; and it follows from this that he understands only himself directly, but everything else only indirectly. If we add to this that conscious and cognitive beings absolutely only can be imagined as individuals, and that unconscious ones only have a half-way and merely indirect existence, then every proper and true existence is found in individuals. If, lastly, we even recollect that the object is conditioned by the subject, that consequently those immeasurable objects external to us have their existence only in the consciousness of cognizing beings, consequently are bound to the existence of individuals who are its bearers, and bound to it so decidedly that in this respect they even can be regarded as a mere endowment, an element of the constantly individual consciousness; — if we, I say, take all this into consideration, then we come to the opinion that only that philosophy is the right one which

is directed towards the internal, which proceeds from the subject as the directly given — that is, the philosophy of modern times since Descartes — and that consequently the ancients overlooked the main point. But the full conviction of this we shall attain only if we, deeply reflecting upon ourselves, bring to our consciousness the feeling of originality which is in every cognizing being. Yea, even more than this: Everybody, even the most insignificant person, finds in his simple self-consciousness himself as the most real being, and necessarily discerns in himself the true centre of the world, yea, the primitive, original source of all reality. And does this original consciousness lie? The strongest expression of it is in the following words of the Upanishad: *hæ omnes creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me ens aliud non est, et omnia ego creata feci* — which then, of course, is the transition to illuminism, perhaps even to mysticism. This, therefore, is the result of the reflection which is directed towards the internal; while the one directed to the external gives us to perceive as the aim of our existence a little heap of ashes.\*

On the classification of philosophy, which is of especial importance with regard to the teaching of it, the following would, from my point of view, be valid.

Philosophy, indeed, has as its object experience; but not, like the rest of the sciences, this or that particular experience, but merely experience itself in general, according to its possibility, its domain, its essential contents, its internal and external elements, its form and matter. I have fully shown in the second volume of my principal work that philosophy undoubtedly has some empirical foundations, and cannot be spun out from mere abstract notions. From this, it further follows that the first thing which it has to take into consideration must be the medium in which in general experience presents itself, besides its form and nature. This medium is representation, cognition — that is, intellect. Therefore, every philosophy has to commence with the examination of the

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\* *Finite* and *infinite* are ideas which have a signification only in reference to space and time, as both these are infinite, that is, endless as well as divisible *ad infinitum*. If we apply these two conceptions to other things, then they must be such as, filling space and time, partake through these of their properties. From this it may be judged how great is the abuse which some boasters and would-be philosophers have carried on with those conceptions in this century.

cognitive faculty, of its forms and laws as well as its validity and limits. Such an inquiry, therefore, will be *philosophia prima*. It will be divided into the consideration of the primary, that is, the intuitive conceptions, which partly may be called *Dianoiology*, or the Science of the Understanding, and into the consideration of the secondary, that is, the abstract notions, besides the legality of its procedure, that is, logic, or the doctrine of reason. This general part contains, or rather supplies the space of what formerly was called Ontology, and exhibited as the doctrine of the most general and most essential properties of things as such, since they took as properties of things abstractly what belongs to them only in consequence of the form and nature of our faculty of representation, as in consequence of this, all beings which are to be comprehended must represent themselves conformably to this, in consequence of which they then obtain certain properties common to all of them. This can be compared to the circumstance that we attribute the color of a glass through which we look to all the objects seen through it.

Philosophy more strictly taken, and following such inquiries, will then be metaphysics; because it not only teaches of the existing, of nature, orders and considers it in this connection, but also conceives it as a given but somehow or other conditioned phenomenon, in which there represents itself a being different from it, which consequently would be the thing in itself. With this now it endeavors to become better acquainted: the means to this are partly the joining together of the external with the internal experience, partly the obtaining of an understanding of the whole phenomenon by means of the finding of its sense and its connection — which may be compared to the reciting of the hitherto enigmatic characters of an unknown inscription. In this way it proceeds from the phenomenon to that which manifests itself, i. e. to what is behind it; hence *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*. In consequence of this, it is divided into three parts:

Metaphysics of Nature;

Metaphysics of Æsthetics;

Metaphysics of Ethics.

But the derivation of this classification presupposes already metaphysics. For this shows the thing in itself, the internal



and ultimate essence of the phenomenon, in our *will*; consequently, after the consideration of it as it represents itself in external nature, its quite different and immediate internal manifestation will be examined, from which proceeds the metaphysics of ethics; but, before this, will be taken into consideration the most perfect and most sublime comprehension of its external or objective appearance, which is the metaphysics of æsthetics.

There is no such thing as a rational psychology; because, as Kant proved, the soul is a transcendent, and, as such, an undemonstrated and unjustified hypostasis; in consequence of which the antithesis of spirit and nature is left to the Philistines and the Hegelians. The essence of man in itself can be understood only in connection with the essence-in-itself of all things, that is, the world. Therefore Plato, in the *Phædrus*, lets Socrates, in the negative sense, ask the question; "Do you suppose that the nature of the soul can be comprehended apart from that of the world?" Microcosm and Macrocosm reciprocally explain each other, whereby it follows that they are essentially the same. These considerations of man's internal being penetrate and fill up metaphysics in all its parts, and can therefore not appear again separated as psychology. On the contrary, anthropology may be treated as an empirical science, but it is partly anatomy and physiology, partly mere empirical psychology, that is, a knowledge of the moral and intellectual utterances and peculiarities of mankind derived from observation. But the most important part of it, as an empirical matter, will necessarily be anticipated by the three parts of metaphysics, and be used by them. What then remains demands a subtle observation and an ingenious comprehension, nay, even contemplation from a somewhat elevated standpoint — I mean from that of some superiority — and is therefore capable of being enjoyed only in the writings of eminent men of genius, e. g. Theophrastus, Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Helvetius, Chamfort, Addison, Shaftsbury, Shenstone, Lichtenberg, and others; but is not to be looked for nor to be borne in the compendiums of professors of philosophy destitute of genius, and therefore opposed to all genius.